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Gerald Winslow to Succeed Wil Alexander
as Religion Dean and Ethics Chair;
Ivan Blazen to Teach Scripture and Ethics
Gerald R. Winslow, Professor of Ethics and Chair of the
Department of Religion at Pacific Union College in Angwin,
California, has accepted an invitation from the Board ofTrustees of Lorna Linda University to succeed Wil Alexander as
Dean of the Faculty of Religion and Chair of the Council of
Consultants for the Center for Christian Bioethics. He will
assume his new duties at Lorna Linda on January 1, 1994.
Until the summer of 1994 when he and his family will move to
Lorna Linda, Winslow will commute by air between Northern
and Southern California.
Wil Alexander, who has announced his retirement effective December 31,1993, has served as Dean of the Faculty of
Religion at Lorna Linda University since 1990. He has also
served as Chair of the Council of Consul tants for the Center for
Christian Bioethics since 1991. A specialist in theology and
clinical ministry, Alexander will continue to serve the campus
in his retirement years as Special Assistant to the President for
Spiritual Life.
Gerald R. Winslow is a graduate of Walla Walla College
(BA, 1967), Andrews University (MA, 1968) and the Graduate
Theological Union in Berkeley, California (PhD, 1979). He
has done post-doctoral studies at Cambridge University, the
University of Virginia and the University of Ttibingen.
A specialist in theological biomedical ethics, Winslow began his professional life as an Associate Dean ofl'vlen at Walla
Walla College in College Place, Washington. After three
fears, he joined the School of Theology at Walla Walla College
where he served until 1987 . Between 1987 and 1989, Winslow
was a Professor of Ethics in the Faculty of Religion at Lorna
Linda University. Since 1989, he has been Professor of Ethics

and Chair of the Department of Religion at Pacific Union
College and Senior Research Scholar of the Center for Christian Bioethics at Lorna Linda University. Winslow has also
taught at Andrews University, San Francisco Theological
Seminary and Newbold College in Bracknell, England. He
has lectured on many other university campuses and served as
a consultant to a number of medical centers in the United
States and elsewhere.
Winslow is the author of many scholarly articles and reviews. His book, Triage andJustice: The Ethics ofRationing LifeSaving Medical Resources, was published by the University of
California Press in 1982. Facing Limits: Ethics and Health Care
for the Elderly, an anthology he edited with James Walters,
Professor of Christian Ethics at Lorna Linda University, was
published by Westview Press in 1992.
Winslow received the local and the national Thomas and
Violet Zapara Excellence in Teaching Award in 1992. In 1985,
continued on page 8
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Quality-of-Life
Is Not A Dirty Word
Robert D. Orr, MD
Director of Clinical Ethics
Loma Linda University Medical Center
Co-Director, Center for Christian Bioethics
Loma Linda University
Many people shy away from using the phrase "quality of
life." They fear it is an insidious concept creeping into our
conversations and decisions that is capable of destroying the
basic tenet of medicine that human life has inherent value.
But quality oflife is at the very heart of medicine. The reason
most patients go to their physicians is that they have a problem
which affects their quality oflife. They expect their physician
to be able to restore their health and thus improve their quality
of life.
One of the problems with using the concept of quality of
life in medicine is definitional. By "quality," some actually
mean "utility" in that a person has little quality of life if he or
she is not productive. Others may take quality to mean
"worth," i.e., importance to others. Even when people use
quality to more correctly mean "value to self," there is still the
problem of defining "life." I\lost quality-of-life discussions
refer to biological life. When quality of life is deemed to be
very low, some may say that the individual's personhood is
gone, and they may then shift the focus from the quality of life
of the person to that of society.
For our discussion, quality of life means a personal statement of the positivity or negativity of multiple attributes that
characterize one's life. It is personal. It is subjective. It may
be different from person to person. It may change from day to
day. We will specifically focus on this subjective quality oflife
of the individual as opposed to the quality of life of his or her
household or the quality of life of society.
What are the attributes which you weigh when you are
trying to evaluate your quality oflife? The several dimensions
of life include the physical dimension (performance of the
activities of daily living, self-care, mobility, symptoms), the
psychological dimension (presence or absence of depression,
anxiety, anger, hope), the social dimension (relationships,
activities, recreation), the cognitive dimension (memory,
alertness, judgment, recognition), and the spiritual dimension
(peace about the meaning oflife and death). In addition there
is the general appraisal which may be called life satisfaction.
Medical professionals often focus only on the physicial
dimension. I spoke at length a few months ago with a young
man who had been quadraplegic and ventilator dependent for
11 years . .My assessment was that he had a rather poor quality
of life. But when I asked him what it had been like, he
responded, "It's not been so bad." He went on to tell me of the
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caring and support of his family, the continued relationships
and activities with friends, his sharp mental capacity and the
technological capabilities with the use of his voice-activated
computer. He rated his relational and cognitive dimensions
higher than his physical limitations. I learned a lot about
quality of life from him.
Let's look at the concept of quality of life first in clinical
medicine, then in the area of research, and finally as it is
involved in our discussions of public policy.

Quality of Life at the Bedside
Quality of life is an important concept at the bedside.
Nearly every visit to a physician is preceded by the patient'
personal assessment of his or her present quality of life and
hopes for their future quality of life.
It also enters into many bedside ethical dilemmas. The
"Can we ... ?" questions in medicine are primarily technical
medical questions. But when patients, families and the healthcare team are wrestling with the "Should we .. . ?" questions,
they are confronting questions of an ethical nature. Quality of
life often figures prominently in these discussions.
In working through these ethical questions, there are at
least four sets of factors which must be considered by the
patient, family and health-care team. 1 First they must think of
the medical factors: what is the diagnosis, the nature of the
disease process, the condition of the patient, the prognosis
and, putting these all together, what are the treatment options? These are primarily factual, but the physician's values
and experience may enter into his or her assessment of the
prognosis and recommended treatment options.
The second factor is the patient's preferences; what are the
patient's values, goals and specific treatment desires? When
the patient has decision-making capacity, this information
may be elicited from the patient. It is part of the physician's
responsibility to see that the patient is adequately informed
about the medical facts and also to assure that the patient is not
being coerced by other people or by external constraints. The
patient's own assessment of her quality oflife will clearly ente'"
into her preferences.
When the patient has lost decision-making capacity, the
team should try to learn what the patient would choose if he
were able. We often rely on written documents, previous oral

Update Volume 9, Number 2

statements, and previous personal choices to make this "substituted judgment." But whatever method we use, we are
rying to make the decision the patient would make, not the
decision which the family or the health -care team would make
either for themselves or for the patient.
There have been several disquieting empiric studies published in the past four or five years which raise serious questions about whether either family members or health-care
professionals are able (or willing?) to accurately express patients' previously stated desires about treatment. 2,3,4,S This
hallowed concept of substituted judgment upon which we
have traditionally relied in the practice of medicine and upon
which most courts have relied to make difficult limitation-of
-treatment decisions may not be as solid ground as we have
assumed.
These two factors, medical indications and patient preferences, are primary ~md are sufficient to allow informed decision -making in most clinical encounters. Sometimes, however,
the medical outlook is very poor and we have no idea what the
patient would want. We still must make a decision even
though these two primary factors do not lead to a clear answer.
We then rely on the other two sets of factors which are quality
of life and contextual features. Because of the prominence
given to personal choice in our society, it is recognized that we
are employing a lower ethical standard when we are forced to
use these factors to reach a bedside decision.
When anyone other than the patient is using his or her own
ssessmentofthe patient's quality oflife to make a decision for
chat patient, they are using the "best interests" standard rather
than the "substituted judgment" standard discussed earlier.
We are transgressing our stated definition of quality of life as
a personal, subjective evaluation when we try to substitute an
external, and supposedly objective, evaluation. Who should
make this objective, but qualitative, decision: the family, the
health-care team, an appointed patient advocate, an ethics
committee, or a probate judge? And further, what standards
should this proxy use to assess the patient's quality oflife? The
two most commonly mentioned are the patient's suffering
(both actual and capacity) and the patient's ability to relate to
others in their environment. These are both very subjective
factors; extremely difficult to quantify, and even more difficult
to weigh. What we are really asking is, "What would most
people want if they were in this situation?" And we are trying
to wrestle at the bedside with the difficult question of whether
there is a minimum acceptable quality oflife below which the
health-care team and society are not obligated to provide lifeextending treatment.
The fourth and final set of factors which may enter into
bedside decision-making are contextual features. What impact will the decision have on others; on the family, the care
team, and on society as a whole? Are there cultural, legal,
financial or institutional factors which should be considered
orior to this specific bedside decision?
/

Quality of Life in Research
Perhaps because of, but at least coincident with, the in-
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creased interest in quality oflife as it affects bedside decisions,
there has been a remarkable increase in the use of quality of
life in medical research. 6 In the past, the outcome variables
measured in research were morbidity and mortality. In recent
years, however, attempts have been made to measure the
impact of various treatments on the patient's quality of life as
well. This measurement is particularly useful when there are
several equally effective therapies, or when there are slight
differences in survival between therapies, or when a proposed
therapy is effective, but risky or toxic, or finally when the
proposed therapy is costly or lifelong, the patients are
asymptomatic, and the disease complication rate is low.
Dozens of scales have been devised, used and reported in
the literature to assess the quality of life of research subjects.
Some of these are designed for specific diseases or for specific
treament modalities. Some measure performance, others
measure symptoms, others measure satisfaction, etc. None is
clearly adequate as an overall measure of quality of life.
Quality of life is a very important outcome variable in
medical research, but is very difficult to measure and even
more difficult to compare.

Quality of Life in Public Policy
When quality of life enters into discussions of public
policy, we must recognize that we are talking on a different
plane because of the differing perspectives of medical practice
and health policy. In clinical practice we think of individual
lives with personal concerns, whereas in health policy we think
of statistical lives and have concerns about effectiveness. In
the former we assess each case as it comes, in the latter we
establish policies which can be applied more or less dispassionately to specific cases. In the former we are patient
advocates, in the latter we are concerned about the good of
society.
It is important to recognize this difference because physicians sometimes make different recommendations for identified patients than they would make for groups of theoretical
patients. Redelmeier and Tversky showed that not only do
physicians often make different decisions for individuals than
for groups, but they recognize that they do this, and in addition, non-physicians recognize that physicians do this and they
expect them to continue to do this. 7 Physicians are bedside
advocates for their patients.
Health planners, however, have a societal perspective.
They are most concerned with whether a treatment works,
how much it costs, and whether the benefit is worth the cost.
They measure effectiveness in "Life-years" and cost in dollars,
and try to determine cost-effectiveness by the number of
dollars it takes to extend a patient's life by one year. We
sometimes contemptuously accuse them of trying to place a
dollar value on life, when in fact, they are merely trying to do
their assigned task of prioritizing funding.
In recent years, this cost-effective reasoning has been
expanded to include assessments of quality oflife. New scales
have been devised such as the "Quality-Adjusted Life Year"
continued on page 7
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How Secret Should
A Patient's Secrets Be?
Duties to Warn and
Reasons for Reticence

A Legal Perspective

Leigh C. Bishop, M.D.
Ass()ciate Professor of Psychiatry
Loma Linda University School of Medicine
Loma Linda, California

Barbara Rostholder Saltzman, RN, MSN, CS, JD
Clinical Specialist in Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing
Los Angeles County Bar Bioethics Committee
California Nurses Association Ethics Committee
Ethics Committee, Jewish Home for the Aging

How secret should a patient's secrets be? According to the
International Code of .Medical Ethics of the World Medical
Association, the answer is "absolute."! That is, all information
confided to a physician by a patient is regarded as absolutely
confidential. My own guess is that this reflects the sensitivity
of an international professional organization to the possibilities of the political abuse of medical privileges. But in this
country at least, and in most codes of medical ethics, confidentiality-while given appropriately high regard-is not guarded
by absolute rules.
A high regard for medical confidentiality appears to be
grounded, within our own society, in our recognition of something like a right to privacy. Privacy, it is true, may be a
fundamental human need in itself; and accordingly the right to
privacy may be regarded as a fundamental right in and of itself.
But in contemporary moral theory, the rights of privacy and
confidentiality are most frequently asserted on grounds related to individual autonomy. That is to say, we tend to
express the value of privacy and confidentiality in terms of the
respect due to persons as having value in and of themselvesas being ends in themselves and not merely means to some
other end. It is an argument which, of course, takes us back to
Kant and his Groundwork.
But rules of confidentiality can be defended, and have
been, not only on deontological grounds-that is, on the basis
of how we ought to treat other people. They may also be
defended on consequentialist principles-on the basis of
achieving some overarching goal or state of affairs. Indeed, it
was primarily a utilitarian defense of the rule of confidentiality
which guided both the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Tarasoff judgment. 2 The majority opinion held that an
overarching social good- the preservation of public safety-is
best served by breaching medical confidentiality in case there
exists a threat to that safety. The dissenting opinion held that
the overarching social good, including the public's safety, is
likely to be sacrificed when treatment of potentially violent
individuals is impaired by judicially mandated breaches of
confidentiality.

At first blush, the issue of patient confidentiality appears
simple, given professional codes such as those of the American
Nurses Association and the American Medical Association
which address the issue. However, since codes require interpretation to implement them in often complex situations, it
is important to understand the nature of confidentiality, potential impediments to its maintenance, and relevant ethical
and legal concerns.
Bok defines confidentiality as "the boundaries surround
ing shared secrets and the process of guarding these boundaries."! Confidentiality is broader than privacy in that it may
encompass matters which are not actually private, but that the
patient may wish "to keep from the knowledge of third
parties."2
Confidentiality may be justified by four premises. These
include autonomy regarding personal information, respect for
relationships, respect for promises that protect shared information, and the benefits of confidentiality to those in need of
advice, sanctuary, and aid.3
While the primary loyalty of physicians, nurses, and other
health-care providers is to their patients, duties owed to
patients sometimes conflict directly with legitimate obligations
to others. One example is where a patient may harm a third
party. If the physician were to honor a duty of confidentiality,
the moral obligation to the third party would be breached.
Such conflicting moral obligations often create ethical dilemmas. 4
Case law provides an important exception to confidentiality regarding a patient's threat to harm a specific intended
victim. The therapist has a duty to warn the intended victim
of a patient who presents a serious danger of violence. s
Unless there is a legal or policy requirement to handle
confidential material in a specific manner, it becomes necessary to balance conflicting obligations. Even with a lega,1
mandate, professional judgment is needed to determin ~
whether the situation falls within the law.
In general, confidentiality protects patients' secrets.
However, sometimes secrecy may be used as a shield to
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Duties to Warn-continued

A Legal Perspective-continued

However the courts have ruled in that case or others, I think
Lhat we in medicine and psychiatry, by our own tradition of
values if nothing else, tend to regard confidentiality as more
closely related to concerns about autonomy than to concerns
about social consequences. In the matter of confidentiality,
we tend to be moved more readily by appeals to respect for
persons. For it is individual persons with whom we chiefly
relate in our daily practice. It is individual persons whose
secrets we hear, and with whom we empathize. And yet we
may find ourselves at conflict in any case, because our duty as
physicians has to do with social goods, in the form of public
health, as well.

protect health-care providers. Keeping secrets to prevent
disclosure of patient-care mistakes is a misuse of confidentiality.6
Numerous factors decrease the likelihood of a patient's
secrets remaining secret. Increasing numbers of health-care
providers are involved in patient care. The American College
of Hospital Administrators has determined that an average of
seventy-five people in major hospitals have legitimate access
to patient records. 7
Computerization and facsimile distribution of medical
records, as well as the common practice of storing charts and
parts of the record in open areas, contribute to the erosion of
confidentiality. Access to computer records by hackers could
lead to stealing private information or adding false data. S
National insurance data banks are used by the majority of
insurance companies to store medical and other information
obtained during application for health or life insurance. Once
records are stored in data banks, they are available to other
participating insurance companies. 9
Involvement of family or friends in patient-treatment decisions, either informally or formally through a previously
executed durable power of attorney for health, may result in
the disclosure of more information than the patient wishes.
Health-care providers must anticipate these issues and encourage patients to clarify parameters early in the treatment
process.
Genetic testing and treatment create conflicts when other
family members are needed for test protocols or decision
making and the designated patient wishes to maintain secrecy.
Some confidentiality issues have been addressed by policies, procedures, and/or legal precedent. Widespread photographing and videotaping of medical events is of concern,
since most invasion of privacy lawsuits are related to picturetaking. lO Disclosure during the informed consent process
must be broad enough to cover the actual intended use of the
photograph or videotape. 11
Personal patient information should be released to the
media only by the designated knowledgeable employee. If
the patient is in the public eye due to being a disaster victim
or in the public domain as a celebrity, more information may
be permissibly released than where the patient is not a public
figure.1 2
Conflicting values may take precedence over confidentiality. States often have reporting requirements for communicable diseases, gunshot and stab wounds, child and elder
abuse, and epilepsy. Government agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human
Services can require release of confidential information. 13
Exceptions to confidentiality include disclosure with the
patient's consent, communication to other health-team members caring for the patient, quality improvement activities, and
disclosure in court when there is no privileged communication
or when the patient waives the privilege.1 4
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is held by the patient
and therefore may only be waived by the patient. In California
this privilege has recently been extended to cover confidential
continued on page 6

Overarching social good may
in rare cases demand the
sacrifice of personal privacy.
Given these considerations, we tend to regard the rule of
confidentiality as being, if not an absolute duty, at least a prima
facie duty. This means that we generally regard confidentiality as something which should only be breached when we
have a sufficiently strong and compelling reason to do so.
Those who choose to breach confidentiality thus bear the
burden of proof in morally justifying such a disclosure. There
are relatively few serious dissenters from this high regard for
confidentiality; the disagreement comes in specifying exactly
which conditions are adequate to justify exceptions to the rule
of confidentiality.
For psychiatrists, of course, the topic of confidentiality
almost immediately calls to mind the Tarasoff case, and the
"duty to warn" which was legally established for the first time
by that ruling. Consider the following rather typical case in
which Tarasoff responsibilities are relevant:
A 35-year-old mother of three was being seen individually in an attempt to address unresolved marital
conflict brought on by the discovery of her husband's
affair. While not psychotic, this patient demonstrated
features of a paranoid personality disorder. Her
characterologic suspiciousness and aggression provided
the context for ongoing and intense rage toward the
husband's lover, long after the illicit relationship had
been terminated. The patient had shared with the
therapist her vengeful feelings 'and fantasies. She
appeared to be in control of her aggression until one day
she reported that she had been overcome with rage at
the suspicion that this other woman might try to call the
husband again. She declared that if this woman did so,
she would kill her. After exploring this with the patient,
and satisfying himself that her threat was not an idle
one, the psychiatrist informed the patient that he was
legally obliged to notify the threatened party of a
continued on page 6
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Duties to Warn-continued from page 5
possible danger. The patient somewhat feebly attempted to discount the seriousness of her intent, but
finally agreed to supply the therapist with the telephone number of the threatened party. The psychiatrist subsequently contacted the endangered party by
telephone and mail to inform her of the threat. This
case posed something of a challenge ethically, however,
when the threatened party called the psychiatrist about
six weeks later to report that the patient had just
repeated her threat by telephone. What should she do,
she inquired, and was the patient's condition such that
the threats should be taken seriously at this later date?
Since the psychiatrist felt that the inquiry might actually represent a bid for information about the patient,
he felt that he \\:,as in something of an ethical dilemma.
He elected to recommend-without disclosing any information about his patient-that the caller take any and
all threats seriously, and that she contact local public
safety officials to ascertain the best means for assuring
her own safety. It was noted that the frequency of the
patient's visits and her rapport with the psychiatrist
both declined following the fulfillment of Tarasoff
duties. She was eventually lost to follow-up.
This case demonstrates a not infrequent result of honoring
the Tarasoff obligation: damage to the alliance between
psychiatrist and patient, with impairment of the therapeutic
effort. This kind of result tends to give credence to the
concerns voiced by Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in
Tarasoff. But it should be noted that such an outcome need
not always be the case. Appropriate exploration of the patient's
feelings of betrayal may avert therapeutic breakdown in some
cases, and I am aware of instances in which the resolution of
conflict introduced by a Tarasoff-type warning actually led to
an enhanced therapeutic relationship. However, the risk of
such damage to the therapeutic effort serves to highlight the
uneasiness with which many psychiatrists bear their duty to
warn. Already an agent of society by virtue of his power to
confine the dangerously violent patient, the psychiatrist's
work is not made any easier by Tarasoff responsibilities. As a
psychiatrist, I am one who trained and entered practice in the
post-Tarasoff era. I am not entirely comfortable with being an
agent of social control, but I cannot imagine a workable
arrangement which would entirely liberate psychiatrists from
some kind of duty to warn. And so I view my discomfort as the
unavoidable price that I, and others who share the feeling,
must pay for the privilege of practicing psychiatric medicine.
Another major area of present concern regarding patient
confidentiality is, of course, the confidentiality of the patient
who is HIV positive. Here again, the ideal of preserving
patient confidentiality is often challenged in terms that appeal
to the public welfare, or at least to the welfare of those who, it
is usually argued, are at some risk-however small- of infectious contact with the HIV -positive patient. The usu ally small
risk of actual exposure to HIV under most circumstances
continued on page 7
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A Legal Persptective-continued from page 5
communications between patients and masters-prepared psychiatric-mental health nurses.1 5
Nowhere is the issue of confidentiality more challenging
than in the care of HIV positive patients. The potential for
discrimination has led to more safeguards than are usually seen
for patients with communicable diseases. Health-care provider access to patients' HIV status and disclosure by providers
who themselves are HIV positive are but two of the many areas
evoking legislation, regulation, and/or case law development.
When health care providers address confidentiality issues, they
palpate the very heart of their relationships with patients. Only by
tempering ethical principles and evolving legal codes with a deep
respect for human dignity can excellent patient care be achieved.
I Sissela Bok, "T he Professional Secret; T he Li mits of Confidentiality," 13 Hastillgs Center Report
Feb. 1983, at 24.
2 Id. at 25.
3 rd.
4 Ruth Macklin, Mortal Choices 165 (Pantheon Books 1987).
5 T arasoff v. Regents of Uniyersity of California, 17 Ca1.3d 425, 435, 131 Cal.Rptr 14, 23, 551 P. 2d
334, 343 (1 976); but see T om L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics
333-335,402-03 (3d ed. Oxford University Press 1989).
6 Bok, supra, at 30.
7 Ann E. Weiss, Bioethics: Dilemmas i1l Modem Medicille 13 (E nslow Publishers, Inc. 1985).
8 Id. at 15.
9 James Endicott, "Absolutely No t Confi de ntial," Hippocrates 55-57 (March/April 1989).
10 Nurse's Halldbook of Lam' & Ethics 89 (Stanley Loeb at ai, eds., Springhouse 1992).
IIId.
12 Will iam W. Feuer, Medical Malpractice Law 10 (Lawpre p Press 1990).
13 Nurse's Handbook of Law & Ethics, supra, at 89-90.
14 Cynthia E. Northrop & Ma ry E. Kell y, Legal Issues ill Nursillg46 1 (The C.V. Mos by Company
1987).
15 Cal. Evid. Code Section 1010 (West Supp. 1993). •
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Duties to Warn-continued from page 6
becomes psychologically inflated in the context of the universally catastrophic result that obtains whenever the small risk is
realized. This is, of course, the reasoning which drove the fears
of professional basketball players recently when ~1agic Johnson
returned to the NBA, and it was what eventually drove him
into retirement once again. Judging by the response of the
media to pronouncements by some health officials in the
~hgic Johnson case, it is currently somewhat fashionable to
belittle those who fear the very small risk of contracting AIDS.
\Vhile in no sense wanting to validate unnecessary alarm about
possible HIV exposure, neither do I feel privileged to make
light of such anxieties.
HIV patients well recognize these fears, and they well
recognize that these fears may be harbored even by those, such
as medical professiqnals, who are well-informed about AIDS.
Socrates and the cognitive theorists notwithstanding, knowledge does not always rule over emotion. And so it is not too
surprising that we find patients requesting, for example, on
admission to psychiatric units, that their HIV status be kept
confidential and not disclosed to the nursing staff. Or, to take
what must be a more frequent occurrence, we find patients
whose HIV status is known only to an AIDS clinic that they
have elected to attend, while keeping their HIV status a secret
from their local physician or other medical consultants.
Gillon has summarized the various arguments that are
typically raised in consideration of AIDS and patient confideniality, and I will not repeat them here.3 But it is worth noting
that the argument to which he finally appeals, in defending the
preservation of confidentiality even in the most dubious of
conditions (such as that of the AIDS patient who announces an
intention to have sex with a known HIV -negative person), is
the very argument used in the dissenting opinion of Taras off,
and by many who continue to doubt the wisdom of Tarasoff.
That is, he appeals to the consequentialist argument that
physicians will better maintain the trust of high-risk patient
groups, and thus, ultimately will have greater influence on
public health, by preserving the confidentiality of HIV-positive patients under virtually all conditions. By this line of
reasoning and others, the tendency to preserve the confidentiality of HIV-positive individuals even in the face of appeals
to the welfare of others has been upheld to a degree unprecedented in the history of public health.
Why does the argument which has failed in Tarasoff now
carry the day with regard to the confidentiality of HIV patients?
I offer two conjectures. The first is that the sheer numbers of HI Vpositive individuals poses a social problem that presently overshadows whatever concerns we may have about preserving, in a
similar fashion, the confidentiality of the threatening psychiatric
patient. Secondly, there are few serious doubts that the Tarasoff
duties serve to avert some, and possibly many, catastrophes. But
there are lingering doubts that analogous disclosures of HIV
~ tatus , except in certain rare circumstances, will actually result in
~duced morbidity and mortality.
1 World Medical Association International Code of I'v1ed ical Ethics, Geneva, 1948.
2 Tarasoff vs. Regents of th e Uniyersity of California, 131 Cal. Rept. 14, 1976.
3 Gillon, R. AIDS and medical confidentiality. Br. Med JI 294, June 27, 1987 . •
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Quality of Life-continuedfrom page 3
(QALY) of Weinstein and Stason, the "leu Treatment Entitlement Index" of Engelhardt and Rie, or the "Quality of
Well-Being Scale" of Kaplan and Anderson. All of these use
some measure of quality of life as a factor in calculating the
numbers to be used in funding decisions.
It does make sense that if treatment A will return patients
to their previous level of good function for the remainder of
their natural lives and treatment B will save their lives for the
same number of years but leave them incomaor pain, A should
be preferred over B. It doesn't take a formula to determine
that.
These formulas may be of some value to health planners as
they assess various modalities of therapy; however, the formulas can be discriminatory if applied at the bedside. For
example if treatment X is applied to a 20-year-old man and
could only restore 80% of his quality, it might give him 40
(0.8xSO) QALY's if he could live until age 70. The same
treatment applied to a 60-year-old woman, even ifit might give
her 100% quality for 10 years, would only give her 10 QAL Y's.
Is that adequate reason to offer the treatment to him and deny
it to her if we are in a competitive situation with scarce
resources? These formulas are not meant to be bedside tools,
but are to be used in policy making.

Conclusion
Quality of life is not a dirty word. It is an increasingly
important feature of medical decision-making at the bedside
and it is being measured and reported more frequently in
medical research. We must be careful in using it, however, to
define it carefully and to recognize its imprecise and subjective nature in these arenas. Equally important, we must be
cautious when we see it being used in health-policy decisions.
Even when research data on quality oflife is used as one factor
in policy recommendations, the imprecision and subjectivity
carryover and may even be amplified in the public policy
arena.
1 Jonsen A, Siegler M, Winslade W. Clinical Ethics 3rd ed., New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1992.
2 Uhlmann RF, Pearlman RA. "Physicians' and spouses' predictions
of elderly patients' resuscitation preferences."lournalo/Gerontology
1988; 43(5):Ml15-21.
3 Starr TJ, Pearlman RA, Uhlmann RF. "Quality of life and resuscitation decisions in elderly patients." lournal 0/ General Internal
Medicine 1986; 1(6):373-379.
4 BachJR, Campagnolo 01, Hoeman S. "Life satisfaction of individuals
with Duchene muscular dystrophy using long-term mechanical
ventilatory support." Am 1 Phys Med & Rehab 1991; 70(3):129-135.
5 Pearlman RA, Uhlmann RF, Jecker NS. "Spousal understanding of
patient quality of life: implications for surrogate decisions." 1 Cli71
Ethics 1992; 3(2):114-123.
6 Spitzer WOo "State of science 1986: quality of life and functional
status as target variables for research." 1 Chron Dis 1987; 40(6):465471.
7 Redelmeier DA, Tversky A. "Discrepancy between medical
decisions for individual patients and for groups." N Eng 1 Med
1990;322(16): 1162 . •
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